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Abstract: Most theories of nationalism focus on majority nationalism and do not provide an 
adequate explanation of the inaction of most ethnic minorities. The first part of this paper adopts 
the political process model from social movement theory to study the factors that prompt 
linguistic minorities to mobilize on ethno-national grounds. Using a large-N statistical model 
with data drawn from the Minorities at Risk (MAR) database, the results indicate that group 
capacity, a favorable opportunity structure, and strong issue framing facilitate ethno-national 
mobilization. The second part of the paper employs a most similar system design to compare 
Uzbek language minorities in Central Asia with the Uyghur linguistic minority in China. The 
focused-structured comparison confirms and extends the findings of the political process model. 
In short, isolated communities, an apathetic Uzbek state, and cross-cutting identities have created 
unfavorable conditions for ethno-national mobilization among Uzbek minorities. Much the 
opposite has been the case for the Uyghur minority in China. 
 
Introduction 
Ever since the French revolution in the 18th century, scholars have recognized 
nationalism as a global phenomenon. Nevertheless, the origin and development of 
nationalism remain the subjects of heated theoretical debate and empirical dispute. 
Although historians have documented the path of the most visible nationalist movements 
reasonably well, the non-action of many other potential mobilizations has gone unnoticed.  
This paper examines the factors that influence ethno-national mobilizations 
among linguistic minorities. Language and religion are among the most salient factors 
that can trigger a nationalist movement. This is not surprising, since nationalism is a 
movement based on cultural claims. Compared to economic wellbeing or political status, 
language and religion are essential to one’s identity (Kymlicka 1996). Because of the 
inherent link between language and ethnicity (Gellner 1983; Argenter 2002), this research 
focuses on minority groups defined by language.  
If each linguistic group is considered as a distinctive nation, then there are too few 
spaces in the world today to accommodate each nation with a state (Gellner 1983). 
According to Gellner’s calculation, there are 8,000 different languages on earth and there 
are currently 200 states. If we “pretend that we have four times that number of reasonably 
effective nationalisms on earth, in other words, 800 of them,” this will still “give us only 
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one effective nationalism for ten potential ones!” (Gellner 1983, 45) Thus, the question 
arises: Why do some linguistic groups mobilize around nationalist claims, while others 
flatly do not. Why do some mobilized linguistic minorities engage in low stakes and 
relatively moderate mobilization, while others opt for maximalist claims, even violent 
separatism? 
To answer these questions, a preliminary review of the current theories is required. 
The following discussion combines the mainstream theories on ethnic nationalism with 
social movement theory models to analyze the dynamics of ethno-national mobilization 
of linguistic minorities.  
Language and Nationalism 
Theorists tend to view nationalism as either a cultural phenomenon rooted in 
history or a constructed product of the modern era (Motyl 2002). Benedict Anderson is 
the leading representative of the second view and arguably the founder of constructivism. 
His landmark 1983 work Imagined Communities challenged the earlier wisdom that 
national myth is ancient and cultural. He revealed how the concept was manufactured by 
the literate class and refined through the interaction between the elite and the people. In 
fact, he argued that the modern nation can only be imagined since the stretched territory 
and sheer size of populations make intragroup intimacy and recognition impossible.  
Another important camp of the nationalism literature argues that the process of 
modernization brought nationalism into existence both in the interest of the state and as a 
political principle (Gellner 1983). For these modernist scholars, nationalism is simply not 
a sleeping beauty awaiting the kiss the modernism (Beiner 1999). Despite theoretical 
disagreements, most scholars (Gellner 1983; Argenter 2002; Anderson 1983; Jung 1987) 
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agree on the essential role language plays in ethnic identity formation. Whereas Anderson 
focuses on the uniform use of literary language as the foundation for an imagined 
community, Gellner stresses the congruence between political and cultural boundaries in 
a monolingual state. It is “through that language, encountered at mother’s knee and 
parted with only at the grave, pasts are restored, fellowships are imagined, and futures 
dreamed” (Anderson 1983). 
 It is consensus among theorists that language defines group boundaries, literal or 
imagined; however, they seldom address the issue of minority nationalism. Majority 
nationalism is usually either a revolution against a dominant class (e.g. the French middle 
class against the aristocrats) or a movement against a foreign power (e.g. the post 
colonialist movement in Africa). In both cases, the nationalists have a relative majority 
base that challenges the ruling class or foreign power. However, in the case of minority 
nationalism, the disadvantaged language group is pitted against the majority. Although 
some linguistic minorities can also argue for the principle of the congruence of political 
and ethnic boundaries, they are inherently in a weaker position to do so. In fact, most 
ethno-national minorities never rise up; they never assert their linguistic identities as a 
foundation for political independence or autonomy within the majority nation-states. The 
existing literature is therefore inadequate to address the question of what drives ethno-
national mobilization among language minorities 
Part of the problem lies in the inherent difficulty in studying non-actions. Political 
scientists, like scientists in general, are studying the casual relationships in the world. 
Where X happened, they search for what factors cause X and how they produce X. But, 
when X does not happen, the absence of the X-causing factor may not be sufficient to 
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establish causality. With a large-N statistical study, it is possible to approach the question 
in a different way. Instead of asking what prevents some minorities from mobilizing, the 
focus should be on what factors influence their decision to mobilize on nationalist 
grounds, and if they do, how their level of movement is affected by various independent 
factors. In the end, although the question cannot be answered definitively, evidence can 
be shown that the degree and quality of certain factors can make a linguistic minority 
more likely or less likely to mobilize on political ground.  
Theories for Nationalist Movement  
Ethno-nationalist mobilization is a form of social movement which often involves 
a special sector of the society. In this study, it is the linguistic minority that is mobilizing 
on a nationalist ground. Therefore, social movement theories are particularly suited for 
the study of minority nationalism.  
Behind most social movement theories today is the rational choice theory. It 
assumes that individuals are rational actors who weigh benefits and cost before taking an 
action (Hechter 1996). People join a movement in the hope of gaining something more 
than they would potentially lose. The assumption is simple, yet very influential in the 
thinking of most social scientists since Jeremy Bentham, the father of utilitarianism. For 
example, in fieldwork conducted in Ghana, David Laitin (1993) used game theory to 
illustrate individual choices in language selection. The local Ghanaian parents could 
choose to send their children to either a school taught in the indigenous language or a 
school taught in English. Laitin finds that the economic pay-off is not the only factor in 
making school choice, local honor and external acceptance were equally influential 
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(Laitin 1993). Thus, rational choice could explain beyond simple economic benefit and 
cost model.  
In addition to rational choice, there are three other important branches of social 
movement theory: relative deprivation, resource mobilization, and consciousness 
construction. The first two stress the structural aspects to explain social movement, 
whereas the last one takes a cultural approach. Relative deprivation focuses on “situations 
producing individual-level stress or discontent as a major cause of social movement 
development” (Kerbo 1982, 646). These unsatisfying conditions are usually the result of 
social stratification or injustice. The “frustration-aggression hypothesis” predicts that as 
discontent increases, the possibility of social movement increases as well.  
Shifting the focus from the underlying motivation to the necessary resources for 
mobilization, social scientists have developed resource mobilization theory. This current 
mainstream theory emphasize the ability of the starters to motivate individuals, gain 
access to power, mobilize social resources and utilize political and economic structures to 
promote certain objectives (Kerbo 1982). In essence, resource mobilization theorists 
consider “structure as relatively stable features of a movement’s environment that 
influence action by shaping opportunities” (Giugni 1998, 372) and “attempt to 
demonstrate empirically that individual behaviors are channeled by a series of structural 
constraints” (Giugni 1998, 367).  
 In recent years, scholars have started to turn their eyes on the “cultural 
formations” in social movement theory. This “consciousness construction” theory focuses 
on “how social movements generate and are affected by the construction of meaning, 
consciousness raising, the manipulation of symbols, and collective identities” (Giugni 
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1998). However, not all theorists take a diametrical view between structural and cultural 
approaches. Myra Marx Ferree suggests that: “individuals should be regarded as 
members of a community whose interests reflect their structural locations” (Giugni 1998, 
365-375). As scholars have explained, it is not the particular issue that is important, but 
also how it is framed (Giugni 1998; Cormier 2003; Cederman and Girardin 2007).  
The above four theories provide useful lenses through which to examine social 
movements, but critics have pointed out theoretical flaws and empirical difficulties in 
applying them.  As implied by rational choice theory, blocked social mobility would lead 
to nationalist movement. For example, education is a universal channel for upward social 
mobility, and people with university education expect more financial rewards than others. 
Thus, when they find their career paths blocked for ethnic reasons, they should be more 
likely to mobilize. In fact, “this emphasis on the cultural elements of nationalism places 
intellectuals, in effect those most able to revive, stimulate and diffuse cultural artifacts, at 
the forefront of any national movement” (Cormier 2003, 529). However, data have 
shown otherwise. Although decreased opportunities among the intellectuals have been 
believed to be the causes of the Irish nationalism in the early twentieth century and 
Canadian nationalism in the 1970s, the data has shown that job markets for college 
graduates in these two countries were actually expanding, not shrinking (Cormier 2003).  
Besides empirical invalidity, rational choice theory also fails to explain extreme 
acts of ethnic violence, like suicide bombers, when the benefits are few and the cost are 
high. Thus it was viewed as ineffective to explain non-economic activities (Hechter 
1996). In order to reconcile this conflict, Varshney introduced the distinction between 
instrumental rationality and value rationality. Whereas the former is a “strict cost-benefit 
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analysis” (Varshney 86), the latter relies on the conscience and perception of the good of 
the people, independent of the prospect of material or immediate gain. By expanding the 
definition of rationality, rational choice theory has been able to explain a broader scope 
of movements.  
Critics have also found two problems with relative deprivation theory. The first 
one is to identify the specific conditions that cause grievance (Kerbo 1982). Another one 
is that since discontents are behind all movements, relative deprivation cannot explain 
why a lower level of frustration may cause mobilization when a higher one does not 
(Cederman and Girardin 2007). Cormier’s study of blocked mobility is such an example. 
Although the deprivation model is intuitively reasonable, empirically it has led to few 
discoveries. 
By using the resource mobilization model, theorists have been able to locate the 
fundamental causes of many social movements. However, they have faced serious 
challenges as well. The first is the free-rider problem. When one can benefit from a 
movement without joining it, one would not participate at all (Kerbo 1982). Thus, 
resource mobilization fails to address how people are dissuaded from free-riding. The 
second problem is essentially the strength of relative deprivation theory. Historically, 
many social movements occurred without significant structural changes in society and 
typically they are the result of mass grievance (Kerbo 1982). Thus, a movement could 
gain momentum before resources became available. 
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Theory and Hypotheses 
Relative deprivation, resource mobilization and consciousness construction each 
analyze social movement formation from a different perspective: grievance-driven action, 
resource-utilization, and issue formation, respectively. By extracting the central element 
from each of these theories, some scholars have proposed a more comprehensive theory: 
the political process model (Morris 2000). Its three components are mobilizing structure, 
political opportunity structure, and cultural framing. Mobilizing structure is the internal 
structure or resource, which includes “informal networks, preexisting institutional 
structures, and formal organization” (Morris 2000, 446). Political opportunity structure 
refers to the outside political environment that provides incentive for action. And, cultural 
framing is the bridge connecting the internal and external structure, “mediating between 
opportunity, organization, and action are the shared meanings and definitions that people 
bring to their situation” (Morris 2000, 446).  
In a sense, the political process theory is a combination of capacity, opportunity, 
and constructed ideas. In the past, nationalist theorists have also addressed similar issue 
of existing network, current situation, and issue formation (Gellner 1983; Anderson 
1983). Existing network refers to the strength of minority group vis-à-vis the majority, 
the institutional structure of community, and formal organizations within the ethnic group. 
Current situation is their political status within the state they reside, treatment by the 
majority, and incentives for action. Issue formation explains how the elites construct the 
meaning of their situation, frame collective identities, and manipulate symbols. Table 1 
below summarizes the application of political process model to the study of minority 
nationalist movements. 
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Table 1. Applying Political Process Model to Minority Nationalist Movement 
 
Political Process Model 
Political Opportunity 
Structure Mobilizing Structure Cultural Framing 
 
 
Minority Nationalist Movement 
External  
Opportunity 
• Political status in the 
state  
• Treatment by majority 
• Outside opportunity 
Internal  
Capacity 
• Strength of the minority 
group 
• Institutional structure 
• Formal organization 
Issue  
Formation 
• Construction of 
meanings 
• Collective identities 
• Manipulation of symbols 
This model is better suited to study minority nationalist movements than previous 
models, because it gives a more inclusive analysis of the mobilization process. It 
incorporates both the internal and the external structure without leaving aside the cultural 
perspective of nationalism. However, its critics point to the limited assumption of the 
prior occurrence of opportunity for political movement (Morris 2000). By stressing 
structural necessity, it neglects the importance of agency and how action could create 
favorable condition for movement. While the criticism is well grounded, the problem of 
the alternative is still empirical validation. It is easy to recognize how individual 
initiatives influence the movement but difficult to prove the causal link. Thus, albeit its 
limitations, the political process model offers a better means to study minority 
nationalism. The model generates the following hypotheses:  
1) The more external opportunity the minority has, the more likely they will 
mobilize on ethno-national ground. 
2) The more internal capacity the minority possesses, the more likely they will 
mobilize on ethno-national ground.  
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3) The better the issue is framed, the more likely the linguistic minorities will 
mobilize on ethno-national ground. 
Research Design 
In order to test these hypotheses in the broadest perspective, this research employs 
a large-N statistical model using the latest data (2006) from the Minority at Risk (MAR) 
database. MAR contains standardized data on the status and conflict of more than 283 
ethnic groups with a population of at least 500,000. It is the most exhaustive and 
frequently cited database on ethnic mobilization among scholars. Apart from the fact that 
it is the best data available, it is selected for another important reason. It measures the 
bases for group distinctiveness of each minority—e.g. language, custom, and religion. 
This is extremely helpful, because many times, language and religion factors intertwine 
with each other. In cases where linguistic and religious cleavages overlap, it would be 
difficult to empirically testify which one is the major cause of nationalism and by what 
degree. Luckily, MAR allows one to choose only linguistic minorities for more control 
and thus adds validity to the examination. In the dataset, LANG is the measure for 
different language group and it is coded from 0-2, 0 means linguistic assimilation with 
plurality group, 1 when a group speaks multiple languages at least one different from the 
plurality group, and 2 for a group that speaks primarily one language different from 
plurality group. Only cases with a LANG score of 2 are selected and this leaves 48 cases. 
Bivariate correlation and OLS regression models are both used to test the hypotheses.  
While the LANG measurement allows one to distinguish linguistic minority from 
other minorities, some scholars have criticized its measures as inadequate (Cederman and 
Girardin 2007; Mabry 2011). In MAR, language difference is measured by language 
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distance – “the genetic relationship of languages that share a common ancestor” – 
without considering the actual difficulty of learning the language and concrete social 
impact of such difference (Mabry 2011). Mabry argued that, “the most important political 
characteristic of any language community in contact with another is the relative social 
and political status of their two (or more) languages” (Mabry 2011, 203). While this 
paper does not consider the linguistic difference as a cause of ethnic conflict, it is worth 
addressing Mabry’s criticism. Although LANG may not be a measure of actual difference, 
it is a good indication that there is a significant difference. A value of 2 in LANG means 
that the minority language is not intelligible to the majority and vice versa. Therefore, it 
is safe to assume there is a linguistic barrier and to a great extent, a cultural division 
between the two. Since language occupies a central position in the formation of ethnicity, 
as it is the essential medium of communication and preservation of national culture 
(Argenter 2002), linguistic difference always leads to cultural difference. Because of this 
strong link between language and culture, the selection based on LANG measure 
produces a set of cases where minorities are actually different from the majority or 
plurality in terms of culture. Therefore, other factors1 that might affect the ethnic 
mobilization of minority can be eliminated and one can focus on how the factors in 
political process model affect ethnic mobilization of linguistic minorities.  
Operationalizing the Dependent Variables 
The dependent variable for this study is ethnic mobilization. In MAR, there are a 
few measures that are directly related to this: protest (0-5), rebellion (0-7), and separatism 
index (0-3).  They are recoded into an Ethnic Mobilization Index (EMI). EMI = (Protest / 
                                               
1
 For example, in the MAR database, BELIEF measures the religious differences between the minority 
gourp and the majority. Among the cases selected here, Pearson’s correlation result show no significant 
correlation (.696 level) between BELIEF and the EMI, the measure for dependent variable here.  
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5) * 20% + (Rebellion /7) * 35% + (Separatism / 3) * 45%. Since EMI is a continuum 
from non-violent protest at one end and separation on the other, each measure is assigned 
with different weights. First, all the measures are divided by its scale in order to make 
them comparable to each other. Then, separatism is weighted the heaviest here because it 
is the most extreme form of political nationalism, separation from the majority nation for 
absolute autonomy. Protest is weighted the least due to its non-violent nature. In the end, 
rebellion is weighted higher than protest for its use of violence, and lower than 
separatism since the measure does not necessarily specify the ultimate level of political 
demand for the rebels. In total, EMI ranges from 0 to 1.  
Operationalizing the Independent Variables 
The three independent variables are internal capacity, external opportunity, and 
issue formation. To operationalize them, five proxy measures are chosen from MAR, 
group spatial distribution (GROUPCON) for capacity, political autonomy (AUTLOST) 
for opportunity and political (POLGR), economic (ECGR) and cultural (CULGR) 
grievance for issue formation. 
Group Spatial Distribution as a proxy for Internal Capacity 
According to political process theory, internal capacity includes networks, 
institutions, and organizations within an ethnic community. While the strength of these is 
difficult to measure and compare across communities, the spatial distribution of 
population might be a good indication of their efficacy. The concentration of the 
population matters because only with a large share and concentrated population can a 
minority be able to construct a self-sustainable political system – “sufficiently large and 
institutionally complete” (Kymlicka 2003, 40). Generally, the more concentrated a 
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minority is, the stronger ties they would have, since it is easier to communicate and 
establish relationships. Although technology has made long-distance connection 
relatively easy and affordable, when it comes to action, a concentrated group is inherently 
better suited than a dispersed one. As the question concerns us is the relationship between 
capacity and mobilization, not capacity itself per se, spatial distribution is a good proxy 
measure for group capacity. In MAR, group spatial distribution is coded under 
GOUPCON (0-3), 0 for widely dispersed, 1 for primarily urban or minority in one region, 
2 for majority in one region, others dispersed, and 3 for concentrated in one region. 
Political Autonomy as a Proxy for External Opportunity 
Opportunity refers to the external “political environment that provides incentives 
for people to undertake collective action” (Morris 2000, 446). In MAR, one measure is 
the index of lost political autonomy based on year of autonomy loss, magnitude of 
change, and group status prior to loss of autonomy. In a range of score from 0 to 6, the 
higher the score, the greater autonomy the minority has enjoyed in the past and the more 
recent such power has been taken away from them. Scholars have found that path 
dependence is a strong factor in ethnic conflict (Cederman and Girardin 2007). If a 
minority has been involved in an ethnic conflict, it is more likely to have more ethnic 
violence in the future than those who did not have such experience. Similarly, if a 
minority had enjoyed relative autonomy in the past, they would be more inclined to rise 
up than those who had never had such privileges. Also, because of their previous 
independence or autonomy, the external environment or the majorities would be more 
sympathetic and acceptive to their demand. Therefore, the index of lost political 
autonomy can be a good measure for external political opportunity. 
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Grievance as a proxy for Issue Formation  
Among the three variables, issue formation is the most troublesome to measure. 
The efficacy of issue formation only not depends on how the issue is interpreted by the 
leader, but also how it is accepted by the mass. Both are subjective standards. In MAR, 
political, economic and cultural grievances are measured by the highest level articulated 
by group leaders or observed by third parties. Explicitly, the codebook states that even if 
the majority of the people might demonstrate lower level of grievance but radicals 
expressed higher one, the higher one will be coded for this ethnic group. Although this is 
not an exact measure of grievances, this touches on some elements of issue framing. One 
important aspect of issue framing is that how it is framed is more important than the 
actual grievance. Naturally, the leader has an incentive to exaggerate the issue in order to 
incite popular sentiment. In this perspective, the higher grievance coded by MAR, the 
more likely the populace will take action. Although it does not address all features of 
issue formation, the grievance measure indicate one way issue formation could affect 
ethnic mobilization. In this paper, the political, economic and cultural grievances are 
recoded into an index of grievance (0-8) which has an aggregate score of the three.  
Analysis 
The Significance of EMI Index 
In the Minority at Risk database, 282 ethnic groups are recorded. Only minorities 
with a LANG score of two2 are selected for this study and this yields 48 cases3 in 36 
countries. Table 2 summarizes the distribution of dependent variable measures.  
                                               
2
 In the MAR codebook, LANG score means that “group speaks primarily one language, different from 
plurality group: Plurality of group speaks the same language AND it is different from plurality group 
language (e.g., Kurds in Turkey or Iraq).”  
3
 For a full list of the countries, see Appendix. 
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Table 2. Distribution of Dependent Variables 
 Protest (0-5) Separatism (0-3) Rebellion (0-7) EMI Index (0-1) 
Average  0.92 1.69 0.51 0.32 
Standard 
Deviation 1.22 1.34 1.57 0.25 
Min 0 0 0 0 
Max 4 3 7 0.84 
Mode (number) 0 (26) 3 (23) 0 (41) 0.15 (8) 
N=48 for Protest and Separatism, N=47 for Rebellion and EMI Index 
It is apparent from the table that separatism is the most significant among the 
three measures from MAR with an average score of 1.69 and with nearly half of the cases 
recording the highest score of 3. On the other side, average scores for protest and 
rebellion are relatively low, 0.92 and 0.51 respectively. Also, the modes for them are both 
0, indicating inactivity. Based on these three, the EMI index has a score range from 0 to 
0.84 and an average score of 0.32. As EMI index reflects the continuum of the nationalist 
movement, its strength can be shown as its correlation with the rest of the measures and 
this relationship is graphically represented in Graph 1.  
Graph 1. Relationship between Protest, Separatism, Rebellion, EMI index 
 
N=47 
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The increase of EMI accompanies the increasing scores of separatism and 
rebellion. In cases where only protest score is high, EMI is relatively low, reflecting the 
non-violent and less intensive nationalist movement. Whereas all three measures are high, 
towards the end of the cases, EMI increases significantly as well, representing the violent 
and intensive mobilization of minorities. Therefore, EMI index is a reliable measure of 
ethno-nationalist mobilization as its distribution follows the theoretical assumption.  
Correlation Check on Independent Variables 
Before examining the relationship between independent variables and dependent 
variables, it is worth making sure that there are no internal correlations between the 
independent variables. Table 3 below shows the correlations between the three and none 
of them have any significant relationship with each other. 
Table 3. Pearson’s Correlations for Independent Variables 
  
Group Spatial 
Distribution 
Political 
Autonomy Total Grievance 
Pearson 
Correlation 1 .096 .215 
Group 
Spatial 
Distribution Sig. (1-tailed)   .257 .071 
Pearson 
Correlation .096 1 .158 Political 
Autonomy Sig. (1-tailed) .257   .142 
Pearson 
Correlation .215 .158 1 Total 
Grievance Sig. (1-tailed) .071 .142   
N=48 
Testing Hypotheses 
 In order to test the bivariate relationships between each independent variable with 
ethno-national mobilization, Table 4 repots the results of Pearson’s bivariate correlations.  
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Table 4. Pearson’s Correlations for Ethno-National Mobilization Index (EMI) 
  Ethno-nationalist Mobilization Index 
H1. Group spatial 
distribution Pearson Correlation .386** 
 Sig. (1-tailed) .004 
H2. Political Autonomy Pearson Correlation .274* 
 Sig. (1-tailed) .031 
H3. Total Grievance Pearson Correlation .758** 
 Sig. (1-tailed) .000 
N=47 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).      
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (1-tailed).      
According to the hypothesis, the higher capacity the minority possesses, the more 
likely they would mobilize on ethno-national ground. With group spatial distribution as a 
proxy measure for higher capacity, Table 3 validates the existence of such correlation. 
Nearly 40% of data confirmed this relationship. For the second hypothesis, the more 
external opportunity the minority has, the more likely they would mobilize on ethno-
national ground. The correlation is weaker, with a value of .274 and significant at a .031 
level. Part of the reason probably lies in the skewed value distribution of political 
autonomy since two-third of the cases have a relatively low score either 0 or 1 on a scale 
of 0 to 5. With so many cases with lower score, the relatively insignificant phenomenon 
is understandable. The strongest evidence is for the third hypothesis: the better [the more 
exaggerated in this case] the issue is framed, the more likely linguistic minorities will 
mobilize. The proxy measure, total grievance has a .758 correlation value with EMI index 
and significant at .000 level. Although the high value is surprising, the strong relationship 
is anticipated. After all, ethno-national mobilization is a political movement and political 
grievance is particularly influential among the minorities examined here. Therefore, the 
initial correlations confirm all three hypotheses. 
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Table 5. OLS Regression for Ethno-national Mobilization Index (EMI) 
  
Standardized 
Error 
Standardized 
Coefficients Beta Significance 
Internal Capacity 
Proxy: Group Spatial Distribution .022 .197 .043 
External Opportunity 
Proxy: Political Autonomy .018 .159 .093 
Issue Formation 
Proxy: Total Grievance .011 .688 .000 
N=47 
From Table 5, it is obvious that total grievance is still the most influential, 
explaining nearly 70% of the variance in EMI and significant at .000 level. Group spatial 
distribution comes the second, with a beta score of .197 and significant at .05 level. 
Political autonomy is the less significant, explaining 15.9% of the cases and significant 
only at .1 level. However, political autonomy nearly became irrelevant when group 
spatial distribution and total grievance are held constant. As demonstrated above, the 
majority of the variance on ethno-national mobilization can be accounted for by the 
framing of grievances. The more political grievances are articulated within a linguistic 
minority, the more likely they will move along the mobilization scale towards manifested 
nationalist movement and even violence. 
Clearly, the third hypothesis is the most supported by the data. This also ties back 
to and confirms the strength of classic relative deprivation theory, which emphasizes 
grievances experienced by the minority as the single most important motivation for 
mobilization. Thus, the intuitive assumption of the relationship is verified here. Group 
spatial distribution is also significant in the result, and this indicates that concentrated 
minority does have a higher tendency to mobilize, again reflecting the importance of 
capacity. And, capacity probably directly links to issue framing: the higher the capacity, 
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the better the minority will be able to frame their grievances. Comparatively, political 
autonomy is the least influential factor here and skewed data accounts for some this. 
Two-thirds of the score on political autonomy is either 0 or 1.  
                 
Although the findings from the statistical studies confirm the importance of group 
spatial distribution, issue formation, and political opportunities, many factors are left 
unexamined. Grievance, a proxy measure, only covers a small portion of issue framing, 
and past political autonomy only captures one part of the opportunity structure. The 
dynamics of how these factors interact with each other and lead to mobilization awaits 
further examination. The second part of the paper provides a close-up comparative 
analysis between the Uzbek language minority outside Uzbekistan in Central Asia and 
the Uyghur minority in China. In recent years, violent acts from the seizure of 
government buildings to riots in the provincial capital have brought international 
attention to the deserts in Northwestern China, homeland to the Uyghurs (Hasting 2011). 
Comparatively, the Uzbek minorities outside their titular state have produced hardly any 
visible nationalist mobilization since the dissolution of the Soviet state.4 Both Uzbeks and 
Uyghurs are Turkic linguistic minorities: they speak similar languages and face 
discriminatory policies from their states of residence. Hence we are left to question why 
the Uyghur language minority has mobilized, but the Uzbeks have produced only 
sporadic and anomic activity. The following analysis will demonstrate how a large and 
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 During ethnic violence that broke out in Southern Kyrgyzstan cities in 2010, the Uzbeks were primarily 
the victim, not the instigator. In comparison, the 2009 riots in Urumqi were followed after a Uyghur 
demonstration during the day, which turned into a violent mob at night targeting Chinese people and Han 
business. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan ceased to be a major operational force in 2001 and, even 
during its active years, there was little evidence to believe that it had represented the interest of Uzbek 
diaspora communities or articulated any secession objective. Its primary concern is religious, not ethnic 
(Siddique 2011).  
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concentrated population, the lack of political entity, and a reinforced identity prompt 
Uyghurs to mobilize on nationalist grounds while isolated communities, an apathetic and 
hostile Uzbek state, and cross-cutting identities discourage Uzbek minority mobilization. 
Background 
The comparative approach adopted here follows a most similar design between 
two Turkic language minorities. Table 6 summarizes the comprehensive characteristics of 
the Uzbeks and Uyghurs.  
Table 6. Uzbek Minority in Central Asia and Uyghur Minority in China 
 Uzbek Minority in Central 
Asia (Excluding Uzbekistan) 
Uyghur Minority in China 
Linguistic Family Karluk Languages under Turkic Language Family 
Intelligibility to the 
majority groups 
All Turkic Family,  
but different degrees of 
intelligibility 
Different Linguistic Family, 
mutually unintelligible 
Muslim Islam Islam 
Area 4 million sq km 9.7 million sq km (Xinjiang) 
Geography Mostly Arid Land Mostly Arid Land (Xinjiang) 
Time under Communist 
Rule 
1924-1991 1949-1985 
Time under 
authoritarian regime 
1991- 
(market economy) 
1985- 
(market economy) 
Liberal Democracy 
Freedom House Index 
6 (average) 
Not Free 
6.5 
Not Free 
State Policy Discriminatory Discriminatory 
Regional Concentration Varies from 18-50%, median 
around 30% (estimates) 
46%, the majority group in 
many Southern districts 
Population 2.7 million  10.1 million (2009) 
Existence of Titular 
State & Its Policy 
Yes, but not sympathetic 
towards its minority population 
No, only small republics 
established twice during 
1940s 
GDP per capita $ 2,700 $ 6,094 ($ 2,898 in Xinjiang) 
Life Expectancy 68.58 (average) 74.84 
   
Nationalist 
Mobilization 
No Yes 
Source: CIA World Book,  The Xinjiang Statistic Yearbook 2010, Freedom House 2012 
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A most similar system design allows the researcher to control for similarities, 
because similarities cannot account for different outcomes on the dependent variable, in 
this case ethno national mobilization. From the beginning, both Uzbek and Uyghur 
people speak Karluk languages – a branch of the Turkic language family – and the only 
two Karluk languages that are still used by significant populations. In fact, Uzbek used to 
be written in the Uyghur alphabet (Abdurakhmanov 1993) and the two languages are still 
mutually intelligible today. Speaking close languages and holding the same religious 
beliefs, the Uzbek and Uyghur Muslims share many similar customs and thus are able to 
communicate with each other without much difficulty. Although Uzbek, along with 
Kazakh, Turkmen, and Kyrgyz are within the same language family, Uzbek is not 
considered mutually intelligible with most other Turkic languages.5 For the Uyghurs, 
Chinese is a distinct language that needs to be taught through education. Despite the fact 
that most Uzbek and Uyghur minorities do speak the majority languages, they are both 
distinct linguistic minorities in their resident countries.  
Today, most Uzbek minorities live in close proximity to their titular state, for 
example the Fergana Valley, a fertile ground shared by Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and 
Tajikistan. In Osh, the second largest city in Kyrgyzstan, nearly half of the population is 
Uzbek. And 28% of the provincial populations, over 300, 000 Uzbeks, live in the Osh 
province. Similarly, Uzbeks constitute 40% of the population in Sughd province, the 
Northeastern region of Tajikistan, and 32% of the population in Qurghonteppa, the third 
largest city in Tajikistan. In South Kazakhstan Province, Uzbek is about 18% of the 
population. Across the border in China, most of Uyghurs live in Xinjiang, the largest 
province of the country. While in Urumqi, the capital of the region, the Uyghur 
                                               
5
 Tajik language is actually a Persian language and thus not intelligible to Uzbeks. 
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population is about the same with that of Han Chinese, in the Tarim Basin, Uyghur is the 
majority group in many cities and villages.  
Bordering one and other, the Uyghur region shares many similar geographic 
features with Central Asia. Both areas contain vast land that is scarcely populated 
(Rudelson 1997). Xinjiang makes one-sixth of the Chinese territory, but has less than 
1.7% of the 1.3 billion population of China. Similarly, the population density for 
Kazakhstan is 6 people per square kilometer, among the least 20 populated countries in 
the world (United Nations 2011). Characterized by mountains, deserts, and steppe, the 
regions are the historical homeland to nomads. Because of the dry weather, extreme 
temperature variation, and limited water resources, agriculture has not been the dominant 
factor in the economy. With the introduction of modern irrigation projects in the 20th 
century, large crop fields and fruit orchards have been established. However, trade still 
plays important role in the regional economy since the age of the Silk Road.  
Central Asia and Xinjiang are not only geographically contingent, but also 
culturally connected throughout history. Today, a strict definition of Central Asia only 
includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. But, in the 
past, the Uyghur region, Mongolia, and adjacent territories in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and 
Iran have all been considered as parts of the Greater Central Asia. In fact, the modern 
borders were only drawn up in the past hundred years. From the Gobi desert to the 
Caspian Sea, the pan-Central Asia region has been subject to constant invasion, cultural 
influence from neighboring powers, and population influx throughout history. The 
relatively flat territory poses no physical barrier for the nomadic people and made 
migration easy. This also led to numerous confrontations between the nomadic and the 
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settled peoples. From the Mongol conquest of Eurasia to the Soviet settlement in Central 
Asia, interactions and exchanges with bordering states have added enormous cultural 
diversity to the region.  
The most significant change beyond ethnicity would be the Islamization of 
Central Asia by Turkic people since the eighth century. This brought religious unity to 
the region and also shaped customs within society. The Muslim brotherhood is crucial, 
because the Central Asian people are surrounded by atheist Chinese, Tibetan Buddhists, 
and Russian Orthodox. In the nineteenth and twentieth century, this has led to Pan-
Turkism, which spreads across the Central Asian Republics and Uyghur region. However, 
under their shared Islamic belief and Turkic culture, there was a paradox for the Uzbek 
and Uyghur identity.  
Uzbek and Uyghur people have long historical roots in Central Asia. Noticeably 
for the Uzbek people, they established a powerful state that reached its height with Öz 
Beg Khan in the early fourteenth century (Soucek 2000). Similarly, the Uyghur 
Khaganate was an influential regional actor in the eighth and ninth century (Soucek 
2000). Despite their historical prominence, the Uzbek and Uyghur people were primarily 
oases-oriented (Rudelson 1997; Sengupta 2002), and neither of them had “consciousness 
of belonging to a particular ‘nation’” (Sengupta 2002, 145). Therefore, the present 
national division among the Central Asian people is a fairly modern and arbitrary 
phenomenon largely shaped by Soviet ethnic policies (Sengupta 2002). The Soviet 
regime delineated the borders and created the nationalities for the people in Central Asian 
Republics. Following the “Big Brother,” the Chinese government also gave the name 
Uyghur to the settled Turkic population in present-day Xinjiang to distinguish them from 
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the dominant Muslim minority, the Hui (Milward 2004). Therefore, both Uzbek and 
Uyghur inherited present-day territory and identity designated by the communist regimes. 
It was also during this time that both regions underwent industrialization and substantial 
economic development. The Soviet legacy is still visible today as the architecture in the 
capital cities and bureaucratic practices in the governments still remind one of the old 
times.  
Since gaining independence in 1990, the five post-Soviet Central Asian states 
have elected governments and liberalized their economies. Similarly, economic reforms 
in China since the 1980s have opened up markets in the Uyghur region. Despite rapid 
economic development in both regions, the respective economies are still relatively 
vulnerable and dependent on state aid. In fact, the average GDP per capita for Central 
Asia and Xinjiang are fairly close to each other. As a result, the living standard and 
income level for the two regions are fairly close. 
Also, discriminatory policies practiced by state governments hindered the 
opportunities for Uzbek and Uyghur minorities. In Central Asia, Uzbek people face 
exclusionary laws and are targeted by the majorities for their economic potency; in China, 
allegedly protected by equal treatment under the Constitution, Uyghurs hold only limited 
and ceremonial political power,6 encounter discrimination in employment, and 
experience racial prejudice in their daily lives.  
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 Although many “important” posts are filled with minority cadres in the provincial government, it is a 
common knowledge that the concrete power are only in the hands of top Han cadres, who are often 
relocated to Xinjiang from other regions (Bovingdon 2002). To illustrate the point here, there is a wide-
spread joke in Xinjiang mentioned by both Bovingdon and Wang. “Late in the 1990s, Jiang Zemin [the 
President at the time] visits Zhao Ziyang [was the general secretary till the aftermath of Tiananmen Square 
Protest] at his home in Zhongnanhai [residential and working place of top party officials], full of false 
cheer, and says, “It's now all these years after June Fourth, and we can use you again. What do you say?” 
Though long since resigned to ignominy, Zhao still perks up at these words. Jiang continues: “How 'bout 
we make you vice chairman?” Zhao smiles, apparently pleased, and indicates to Jiang that he wants to 
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To summarize, similarities of geography, political history, socio-economic 
development, and culture (language, religion, and some customs) cannot account for the 
very different levels and types of ethno-national mobilization across the two groups. The 
Uyghurs have been increasingly vocal in international society and have confronted the 
majority through both violent and peaceful means, whereas Uzbek minorities in Central 
Asia have produced neither a nationalist movement nor any substantial secessionist 
claims. As the first part of this paper suggests, population distribution, political 
opportunity and issue formation are the three main factors that affect the level of 
nationalist mobilization among linguistic minorities. Empirical evidence and 
anthropological studies reveal that differences in these factors do contribute to the 
different decisions and actions of Uzbek and Uyghur linguistic minorities. The following 
analysis illustrates how population density and distribution, the existence of a titular state, 
and the framing of cultural identity have shaped the mobilization of the Uyghur minority 
and the de-mobilization of the Uzbek minority. 
Population Density and Distribution 
As a simple Chinese proverb states, “the more people the more power”: 
population is always an important factor. The size of population speaks for the strength 
and potential of a community. Ethnic majorities constantly fear that rapidly growing 
minorities will eventually overpopulate them, and the minorities know that population 
size is a great source of bargaining power against the dominant group.7 The 8.4 million 
Uyghur people are mostly concentrated in Xinjiang, especially in the southern region 
                                                                                                                                            
whisper a message. When Jiang shifts his bulky body closer, Zhao shouts at him, "I'm not a Uyghur!”” 
(Bovingdon 2002, 58-9; Wang 2010, 80). 
7
 The most recent example would the growing Islamic population in Europe and the tension between 
Muslim and secular population.  
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where they enjoy an absolute majority except a few towns built by the Xinjiang 
Production and Construction Corps (XPCC).8 In three of the ten most populated 
administrative districts in Xinjiang, Uyghur people make up more than 90% of the 
population.  
As mentioned above, the Uzbek minority enjoys similar regional concentration in 
various border regions close to Uzbekistan. Nevertheless, the Uzbek minorities are 
scattered across international borders. Although the post-Soviet Republic citizens can still 
move between the independent countries, the politically separated minorities face 
challenges that the Uyghurs, residing in a single country, do not. Even though technology 
has made international communication reliable, the physical separation still makes 
regular gathering and meeting difficult. In Central Asia, the total population of Uzbek 
minorities is 2.7 million: 1.2 million in Tajikistan, 759, 000 in Kyrgyzstan, and only 
490,000 in Kazakhstan. Comparatively, there are 3.5 million Uyghurs in Kashgar region 
alone, which has been historically the Islamic center of the Turkic minority in China. 
Table 7 compares the Uzbek population in four Central Asian countries with the Uyghur 
population in the most populated cities in Xinjiang.  
Table 7. Uzbek Minority Population in Central Asia and Uyghur Popualtion in China 
Uzbek Minority Uyghur Minority 
Tajikistan 1,188,563 Kashgar Administrative Offices 3,535,495 
Kyrgyzstan 758,550 Ili Kazak Autonomous Prefecture 729,710 
Kazakhstan 490,616 
Counties Direct Under Ili 
Prefecture 678,652 
Turkmenistan 252,741 Urumqi City 309,853 
Total  2,690,470 Total 5,253,710 
 Source: CIA World Book, The Xinjiang Statistic Yearbook 2010 
 
                                               
8
 XPCC is a special semi-military governmental organization for economic development. Under Chinese 
governmental system, it enjoys the provincial status since it manages its own settlement cities, farms, 
factory, and some military forces.  
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Even though the Uzbek population is significantly smaller than Uyghur when it 
breaks down into subdivisions within the region, their presence in Central Asia cannot be 
neglected. After all, the overall population of the Republics is smaller, and Uzbek 
minorities make up more than a third of the population in many cities. However, the 
geographical barrier further limits their ability to mobilize across the region. Logically, 
given that Xinjiang is more than twice the size of Central Asia, communication between 
the Uyghurs would be more difficult than it is for the Uzbek minority. Further, most of 
the Uzbek people are settled around their titular state, whereas the Uyghur people reside 
along the edges of the two deserts, which occupy the majority of the territory. But this 
situation changed dramatically during the twentieth century. After roads were cut across 
the impassable desert in Xinjiang, a trip that used to take months now only takes several 
days (Rudelson 1997). Also, economic development in China has led the government to 
invest heavily in the infrastructure of the region, bringing the Uyghur people into a well-
connected community.  
Positioned on the mountains surrounding the Fergana Valley, the Uzbek 
communities on the other hand are physically much closer to each other; but mountain 
passes, unlike desert roads in Xinjiang, are more often subject to weather conditions, 
especially during winter. When these routes are closed, Uzbeks could theoretically have 
easier access to one another through the fertile Fergana valley, now mostly located in 
Uzbekistan. However, starting in 1999, the Uzbek government unilaterally closed its 
border and stopped cross-border mass transportation. This broke the connection between 
the motherland and the diaspora community. As one Uzbek minority explained: 
The bad side is … when I, being an Uzbek, go to Uzbekistan tomorrow, it 
will be difficult. I’ve got relatives … I can’t go freely … Now look at this! 
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My relatives are one kilometer away, but I’ll have to get a visa from the 
embassy in Bishkek. (Liu 2012, 48)  
 
Being cut off from the “motherland,” many Uzbek communities lost the only reliable 
access to other communities beyond the Uzbekistani border. The isolation of individual 
Uzbek communities from both the mother country and other co-national communities has 
made regular communication extremely difficult and thus mobilization less possible. 
Also, it is easier for governments to have checkpoints in the mountains, where roads are 
few, and harder in the open desert where side trails are many. Thus, scattered in the 
mountainous region, the Uzbek minority communities are isolated from co-nationals in 
other Central Asian Republics.   
The Existence of a Titular State 
The second factor for minority mobilization highlighted in the general model is 
political opportunity. In this case, the existence of a titular state seems to make the 
difference. The Uzbek people have Uzbekistan, the most populous state in Central Asia, 
but the Uyghur people have been stateless for sixty years. Except twice, for brief periods 
during the early twentieth century, East Turkistan was virtually non-existent; and it is a 
forbidden subject in contemporary China. Even when the Uyghur minority was able to 
gain a political stronghold, the proclaimed “independent state” was only able to 
incorporate a few towns. East Turkistan never encompassed the whole region or even the 
majority of today’s Xinjiang.  
For Uyghur people, the absence of a sovereign Uyghur state prompted many to 
strive for one. “Many Uyghur were particularly disappointed that the independence of the 
former Central Asian republics of the Soviet Union in 1991 did not lead to independence 
or at least increased autonomy in their own autonomous region” (Gladney 2004, 379). 
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This probably prompted the early wave of a Uyghur nationalist movement (Gladney 
2004). For example, in April 1990, hundreds of armed Uyghurs occupied the local 
government in Baren, a small town in Southern Xinjiang, and were able to hold off the 
Chinese military for several days until they were eventually defeated (Hasting 2011). The 
choice of the Uyghur nationalist target suggested an unmistakable political message, 
taking over the government; and this was not an isolated incident where ethnic violence 
had a political undertone. “In August 2008 two Uyghurs in Kashgar ran a stolen truck 
into a group of soldiers, killing 16 of them and wounding 16 others” (Hasting 2011, 911). 
Seen as symbols of Chinese dominance, government and military have become the 
targets for some Uyghur nationalists to express their political demands.  
For the Uzbek minorities, there is little room for such political maneuvering. After 
all, their titular state is just across the border; and they could technically go there for 
relief any time they choose. The existence of an exit option makes their political demands 
less persuasive in an increasingly nationalistic atmosphere in Central Asia. Each Republic 
is only promoting the interest of its own ethnic group without much consideration for the 
minorities, whose interests are ostensibly already represented through their titular states. 
While the country of residence has little tolerance for minority voices, the mother country 
apparently has less interest in its people’s community in neighboring states. When 
Uzbekistani President Islam Karimov learned about the secession movement in Osh, a 
bordering city in Kyrgyzstan with a significant Uzbek population, he simply asked them 
to dismiss their claim in order to maintain regional stability (Liu 2012). Some Uzbeks felt 
bitter; nevertheless they accepted his leadership.  
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The Uzbekistani government’s obsession with security due to terrorism has only 
further alienated its diaspora communities abroad. The de facto closure of the border was 
only one example. It also made the process of migration back into Uzbekistan more 
difficult (Liu 2012). Thus, caught between a hostile state of residence and an apathetic 
mother country, the Uzbek minorities have found themselves stranded in enclosed 
communities and unable to raise “valid” political claims. In the Uyghur case, the absence 
of sovereign state generated a centripetal impetus, mobilizing people towards a political 
goal. By contrast, the Uzbek diaspora populations in Central Asia were pushed to the 
margin by the unwelcoming, centrifugal force from their very own titular state.  
Issue Framing and Cultural Identity 
 As mentioned before, both Uzbek and Uyghur identities were heavily shaped by 
Soviet or Soviet-style policy. Before that, “ethnoterritorial states had never existed in 
Central Asia in the first place and that its inhabitants never aspired to achieving state 
status – until Soviet rule had created and configured them by fiat in the 1920s and 1930s” 
(Liu 2012, 64). However, even during Soviet times, the introduction of titular republics 
did not create a pan-nationalist sentiment for each of the leading minority groups. Instead, 
collective farms actually reinforced pre-exiting clan identity. As Akbarzadeh (1996) 
noted,  
The Soviet cotton plantation campaign of the 1950s was achieved through 
forceful relocation of whole villages from the fertile grounds of the Hissar 
valley and Gharm region to the southern Vakhsh valley. The settlers 
brought their traditions with them and kept them unchanged thanks to the 
minimum-contact kolkhoz system. To the present day it is still quite 
common to find Uzbek kolkhozyin the Vakhsh valley which have very 
little to do with their neighbouring, say Gharmi, kolkhozy. The Soviet 
system, unintentionally perhaps, has preserved the parochial set up of the 
countryside (1107). 
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Since group identity is invariably tied to land, these Uzbek minorities ended up having 
weaker tie to their “motherland.” Also, clan identities in Central Asia today are based less 
on blood ties, but more on geographical proximity (Akbarzadeh 1996). A relative living 
across the border may not be considered part of the “family,” but a close friend next door 
would be. This clan identity is also manifested through politics. In many Central Asian 
Republics today, political parties are not ideologically oriented and politics are played by 
several “families” representing different parts of the country.  
This primary identity to one’s birthplace, instead of ancestral tie, is also evident 
among Uzbeks in urban areas. When interviewed, many Uzbeks in Osh, Kyrgyzstan, 
never considered themselves as minorities. “‘Don’t call us a minority! We are a majority 
in Osh [Kyrgyzstan], and in cities like Jalal-Abad [Afghanistan] and Uzgen [Kyrgyzstan]. 
Don’t call us a diaspora, either. Diaspora means separation from an original homeland. 
We’ve been here in these cities for centuries! It is the Kyrgyz who came recently’” (Liu 
2012, 11). If their attachment to the state of residence is stronger than that to Uzbekistan, 
then Uzbek minorities face a significant obstacle in mobilization: they cannot unite under 
a primary identity, the Uzbek people from Uzbekistan.  
By way of contrast, the Communist influence in Xinjiang is much shorter-lived. 
The Chinese regime did not have effective military control of the region until the early 
1950s. Lacking effective local network and cadres, especially Uyghur-speaking ones, the 
Beijing government could not enforce a thorough reform as it did elsewhere in China 
(Milward 2004). Thus, the commune system was introduced fairly late in the 1960s and 
lasted only twenty years till the economic reform during 1980s. As a result, the clan 
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identity was not reinforced in Xinjiang. Instead, the economic reform created pan-Uyghur 
solidarity among the people. 
The introduction of market economy had two major impacts on the Uyghur people, 
the massive Chinese in-migration to Xinjiang, and the Uyghur labor migration working in 
coastal regions. Prior to the economic reform, Uyghur people were the absolute majority 
ethnic group in Xinjiang. Although there had been steady increase of Chinese population 
since 1950s, most of them came with the XPCC and stayed in newly built cities. In other 
words, there were Chinese enclaves within a vast region, but no significant community in 
Uyghur populated cities. However, since the 1980s, many Han Chinese have moved to 
Xinjiang seeking economic opportunities, like trading with Central Asian states, tapping 
natural resources, or simply starting new lives. In thirty years, the demographics of 
Xinjiang changed drastically. Now the Ugyhur population is only slightly higher than the 
Chinese population, 46% compared to 40%. Even though Ugyhur and Chinese still live in 
segregated quarters within cities, now the two groups do encounter and interact with each 
other on a daily basis.  
This sudden influx of Han Chinese population created a crisis for the Uyghur 
people as they tried to adjust this new reality. Since political and economic resources are 
concentrated in the hands of Han Chinese, many Uyghur view Chinese people as invaders. 
For them, this is a classic “colonial story” where an outside group with advanced 
development is trying to take over the land of the native people and change their 
traditions. Of course, this is a biased representation of the situation; nevertheless, it is a 
mentality shared by many frustrated minorities as one Uyghur vendor testifies: “The Han 
are a rude people, they look down on us. They think they own Urumqi and act however 
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they want here” (Kaltman 2007, 115). Thus, despite the economic development in the 
region, many Uyghurs still consider Chinese people as “colonizers.” 
At the same time Han Chinese have been moving into Xinjiang, Uyghur youth are 
“going out” into the Chinese heartland in search of employment. Once they leave their 
hometown, local identities lose their significance. To most Chinese people, the internal 
regional differences between the Uyghurs do not matter.  The difference only falls on 
ethnic or racial distinction, one is either a Uyghur or not. Uyghurs working in the coastal 
region soon realized that beyond their oasis identities, they shared a common identity as 
the Uyghur people, which overrides other identities as far as Chinese are concerned. 
Therefore, the twofold consequence of economic reform brought the Uyghur people in 
direct contact with the Han Chinese, and organized them along the ethnic distinction. 
From this, a pan-Uyghur identity beyond the intellectual class is born.  
However, the distinction is not as clear-cut for the Uzbek minorities. As 
mentioned above, the Central Asian people had never envisioned ethnoterritorial political 
entity; instead, people were grouped by place of residence because different Turkic 
language groups lived together. This is still true to this day. When Kazakhstan gained 
independence after Soviet dissolution, Kazak people were not the absolute majority 
ethnic group of the country; only recently did they make up 50% of the population. 
Traditionally, all Central Asian people were considered the Turkic people without 
specific national titles assigned to each group. In fact, even the titular group today is far 
from being homogenous. Each national group was formed by a variety of ethnic clans, 
which could have been organized under different subgroups (Sengupta 2002; 
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Abdurakhmanov 1993). Thus, the distinction between Turkic peoples, though evident, is 
not as strong as the one between Uyghur and Han Chinese.  
Another important factor is economic disparity. In Xinjiang today, the massive 
Han Chinese migration has unleashed the cruelty of market forces. Uyghurs are 
constantly discriminated against because of their insufficient Chinese language skills 
(Kaltman 2007). In fact, lack of proficiency in Chinese has become a major barrier, 
preventing them from integrating into the greater Chinese market.9 Backed by political 
connection and economic support from relatives in richer provinces, the Han Chinese 
possesses most of the economic resources and push Uyghurs into less lucrative business 
(Zang 348).10 Also, the state-owned oil fields and natural gas pipelines supply energy to 
the coastal region without distributing the profits to the local Uyghur people. As a result, 
many Uyghurs are bitter about Chinese stealing their resources and driving them out of 
the market. Besides the visible economic inequity between Uyghurs and Chinese in 
Xinjiang, there is also a regional disparity between Western and Eastern regions of China 
with the former significantly poorer than the latter. As Uyghur started to work in the 
more affluent cities in the coastal region, they gained first-hand knowledge of how the 
Beijing government has neglected their home region and what their hometown could 
become if more resources were directed toward the Western region.  
By contrast, the economic differences between Uzbek minorities and other Turkic 
majorities are less significant. Although the economic condition in Xinjiang is 
comparable to Central Asia, the average GDP per capita of the five post-Soviet Central 
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 However, some businessmen who speak fluent Chinese did benefit handsomely from this access to the 
Chinese market. 
10
 However, the situation is different for petty entrepreneurs and street vendors. Kaltman in his book talk 
about a story where the Chinese restaurant owner and the Uyghur kebab-stand owner work with each other 
to attract more customers.  
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Asian Republics is less than half of that of China. Also, the annual growth rate for these 
Republics is significantly lower than their Eastern neighbor. The titular groups do have 
more economic resources than the minorities, but not to the degree one witnesses in 
China. Also, Uzbeks are traditionally specialized in trade and carpet making, two major 
industries where they still enjoy control to this day. Despite the economic gap between 
the Uzbek minorities and the majority group, the former still fare reasonably well since 
only a few people, even among the latter, are wealthy. Comparatively, the disparity is less 
significant than the one between the Uyghurs and Chinese. Also, the stagnated economy 
in Uzbekistan made their motherland less appealing for Uzbek minorities. 
For Uyghur, the Han Chinese people are racially different outsiders who are 
overtaking their economic resources in Xinjiang. Thus, the cultural, social and economic 
cleavages all fall along on the same ethnic division creating a reinforcing identity for the 
Uyghurs. For many of them, it is the Chinese people who do not respect their religion, 
encroach on their living space, and discriminate against them in employment (Kaltman 
2007). Although some Uyghur businessmen have become wealthy thanks to their access 
to the vast Chinese market, most Uyghur people did not benefit as much as Han Chinese 
did from economic growth. Therefore, the daily interaction with the majority group and 
the greater integration of the whole region created a Uyghur consciousness against the 
backdrop of Han dominance. 
The Uzbeks are situated in a more complex environment. There is no drastic 
contrast between the ethnic groups as the one in China; after all, most Central Asians are 
Turkic people and they have all been long times settlers. The settler versus invader 
mentality simply does not exist in the region today after independence and Russian 
36  
outmigration. In fact, most Turkic people historically have been categorized by their 
place of residence – their clan identity – not their “nationality,” which did not exist prior 
to the twentieth century. Even during the Soviet time, a person’s primary identity was not 
centered on ethnicity. It is only after independence that each titular state started the actual 
“national project” to build its own historical narrative and cultural distinction. This meant 
that people do not necessarily base their nationality on ethnicity. As many Uzbek 
minorities in Osh said, they see themselves as Kyrgyzstani citizens because the city they 
live in belongs to Kyrgyzstan (Liu 2012). It is difficult to tell how long this 
“geographically based” citizenship will hold amidst the increasingly nationalistic 
environment in Central Asia, but as of now their attachment to the land impedes any pan-
Uzbek minority mobilization. As a result, the mixed concept of nationality and closer tie 
to other Turkic people generates a cross-cutting identity for the Uzbek minorities. They 
are culturally similar to their Turkic brothers, and the economic gap between the Uzbeks 
and the majorities are not that appalling.  
Because the Uyghur identity is reinforced while Uzbek’s is not, their communities 
are differently orientated. For the Uyghurs, the unavoidable interaction with Han Chinese 
and the growing Uyghur nationalism made them actively voice their dissatisfaction. From 
peaceful demonstration to militant uprising, the Uyghur people had their concerns heard 
both domestically and internationally. Even though their intellectual class has been 
largely co-opted into the Chinese system, daily experience of marginalization has 
informed the Uyghur people of their own identity. However, the Uzbek minorities, 
“abandoned” by their motherland and marginalized by their country of residence, turned 
inward. Although they had been victims of ethnic clashes, they kept their dissent to 
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themselves. Community leaders agreed that open protest and secession movement would 
provide no good for their people, and Uzbek journalists self-censored local minority 
newspaper to prevent breeding any political extremism or inviting majority suppression 
(Liu 2012). Instead of transforming the discrimination issue into argument for activism, 
the Uzbek prized their own seclusion as the sign of their own moral superiority and purity 
over the majority (Liu 2012). Table 8 summarizes the difference between Uyghur and 
Uzbek minorities on issue formation. 
Table 8. Issue Formation for Uyghur and Uzbek Minorities 
 Uyghur Minority in Xinjiang Uzbek Minority in Central Asia 
Identity Contrast Turkic People vs. Han Chinese Turkic People vs. Turkic People 
Disparity between 
minority and 
majority 
Increasingly economic gap 
Chinese holds control of most 
industries 
No significant economic disparity 
Uzbek holds control of certain 
industries 
Identity 
Formation 
Original settler vs. Chinese 
“invader”  
Reinforcing identity 
All long time setters 
Attachment to birthplace 
Cross-cutting identity 
Orientation Outward, voicing 
dissatisfaction 
Inward, cultivating self-
recognized moral superiority 
Result  Mobilize De-mobilize 
 
In the end, strengthened by large population and regional cohesion, the Uyghur 
minorities are able to construct a national narrative based on economic disparity and 
cultural distinction (Hess 2009). From the massive Han migration and economic 
development in China, the Uyghurs see both the threat and the potential of their own 
community. Thus, the reinforcing identity created a strong consciousness across the 
Uyghur people in Xinjiang. Without a political entity, they have mobilized on nationalist 
grounds seeking their own political, economic and cultural autonomy.  
Isolated by geographical and political barriers, the Uzbek minority communities 
in Central Asia have not been able to forge a regional alliance across international 
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borders. This cross-cutting identity makes building a cohesive political agenda extremely 
difficult. Politically marginalized but economically potent, the Uzbek people have been 
continuously targeted by the majority groups. Yet, the lack of broader linguistic group 
cohesion has made the Uzbek minorities turn inward. Afraid of retaliation, many Uzbek 
minorities prefer to remain silent (Liu 2012). Therefore, the very issues that have been 
framed to prompt mobilization in the Uyghur case have been used to de-mobilize the 
Uzbek people.  
Conclusion 
Ethnic nationalism, though often seen on the news, is actually not the dominant 
choice for most linguistic minorities. In fact, very few language minorities mobilize on 
nationalist grounds. By using the political process model and utilizing the Minority at 
Risk database, this study shows that capacity, political opportunity, and issue formation 
are the three major factors affecting the decision of mobilization. The higher the capacity 
(measured by population density), the greater the opportunity (measured by previous 
political autonomy), and the better the issue is framed (measured by exaggerated 
grievances), the more likely a linguistic minority will mobilize.  
In the case of the Uyghur, a Turkic minority with a large and concentrated 
population well connected by transportation, the lack of political sovereignty actually 
created an impetus for political action. Facing massive Han Chinese migration and 
increasing economic disparity, Uyghur has been continuously reinforced by job 
discrimination, cultural stigma, and lack of political power. All these factors created a 
fertile ground for the growth of Uyghur nationalism and prompted many of them to take 
action for their political ideal.  
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Across the Chinese border in Central Asia, the Uzbek minorities find themselves 
in a similar, yet distinct reality. Facing discrimination from the majority and the state of 
residence, their hope for pan-Uzbek mobilization is dimmed by geographical difficulties 
and de facto closure of border by their motherland. The sheer existence of Uzbekistan 
and their relative economic well being within the state of residence also renders the 
political claims by Uzbek minority less persuasive, even though the “exit option” is not a 
real option anymore. In the end, their tie to the land and connection to other Turkic 
people create a cross-cutting identity that is difficult for them to forge into a cohesive 
nationalist agenda. 
Future research should consider several possibilities. For example, the 
examination and quantification of internal capacity still pose a serious challenge for 
nationalism scholars. Even in a small comparative model here, the vast network dynamic 
inside a single ethnic group is still a formidable task that needs research innovation. In 
the comparative study, the 2-million-strong Uzbek minority in Afghanistan, the biggest 
diaspora population outside Uzbekistan, is completely excluded due to different historical 
background and recent development. How this community affects their co-nationals and 
Uzbekistani state policies would be an interesting subject to pursue. This study is only a 
start for the analysis of minority nationalism, and further academic rigor and attention 
should be directed to this subject to develop a more substantial understanding of ethno-
national mobilization. 
 
 
 
40  
Appendix 
Table 9. Country List and Their Respective Score for Each Measurement in MAR 
Linguistic 
Minority 
Home Country Group 
Spatial 
Distribution 
(0-3) 
Political 
Autonomy 
(0-5) 
Political 
Grievance 
(0-4) 
Economic 
Grievance 
(0-2) 
Cultural 
Grievance 
(0-2) 
Protest 
(0-5) 
Separatism 
(0-3) 
Rebellion 
(0-7) 
Hazaras Afghanistan 2 5 2 2 0 0 3 0 
Uzbeks Afghanistan 3 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Bakongo Angola 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Armenians Azerbaijan 3 1 4 1 0 0 3 1 
Russians Azerbaijan 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Biharis Bangladesh 0 1 2 2 0 0 1 0 
Russians Belarus 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Poles Belarus 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 
Rohingya 
(Arakanese) 
Burma 3 0 4 0 0 1 3 0 
Serbs Croatia 1 2 2 2 1 2 3 0 
Turkish 
Cypriots 
Cyprus 3 1 4 0 0 3 3 0 
Hutus Dem. Rep. of 
the Congo 
3 0 0 0 0 3 0  
Haitian 
Blacks11 
Dominican 
Republic 
0 0 1 1 0 3 0 0 
Russians Estonia 1 2 1 1 2 0 3 0 
Afars Ethiopia 3 3 3 1 0 0 3 0 
Somalis Ethiopia 3 0 4 1 0 0 3 5 
Tigreans Ethiopia 3 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 
Amhara Ethiopia 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
East Indians Fiji 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 
Russians Georgia 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Malinke Guinea 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bodos India 3 1 4 0 0 3 3 1 
South 
Tyrolians 
Italy 3 1 4 0 0 3 3 0 
Russians Kazakhstan 3 2 4 0 1 0 3 0 
Somalis Kenya 3 1 1 2 0 0 2 0 
Hmong Laos 3 2 4 0 0 0 3 0 
Russians Latvia 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 0 
Russians Lithuania 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Slavs Moldova 1 0 4 1 2 0 3 0 
Berbers Morocco 3 1 1 0 2 0 1 0 
                                               
11
 The name was given by the MAR to describe Haitian descendants in Dominican Republic. 
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Tuareg Niger 2 1 3 2 0 0 3 0 
Ahmadis Pakistan 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Pashtuns 
(Pushtuns) 
Pakistan 3 1 3 2 0 1 3 5 
Mohajirs Pakistan 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Roma Slovakia 2 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Indian Tamils Sri Lanka 2 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Sri Lankan 
Tamils 
Sri Lanka 2 1 4 2 1 1 3 7 
Jurassians Switzerland 3 0 4 0 0 1 3 0 
Russians Tajikistan 1 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 
Malay-
Muslims 
Thailand 3 1 4 1 1 3 3 5 
Russians Turkmenistan 1 2 0 0 0 2 1 0 
Russians Ukraine 3 2 3 0 1 2 0 0 
Crimean 
Russians 
Ukraine 3 2 4 0 2 4 3 0 
Russians Uzbekistan 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Kosovo 
Albanians 
Yugoslavia12 3 5 4 0 0 3 3 0 
Hungarians Yugoslavia13 3 5 3 1 0 3 3 0 
Europeans Zimbabwe 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 
Ndebele Zimbabwe 3 1 4 2 0 0 3 0 
 Average 2.13 1.21 2.02 0.65 0.33 0.92 1.69 0.51 
 Standard 
Deviation 
1.06 1.29 1.63 0.79 0.63 1.22 1.34 1.57 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
12
 The country referred here should be Serbia. It was before the independence of Kosovo.  
13
 The country referred here should also be Serbia where the Hungarian minority resides in the north of the 
country. 
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Table 10. Scores of measurement of Independent and Dependent variables for each Linguistic 
minority group 
Linguistic 
Minority 
Home 
Country 
Group Spatial 
Distribution 
(0-3) 
Political 
Autonomy(0-5) 
Total Grievance 
(0-8) EMI INDEX (0-1) 
Bakongo Angola 3 1 0 0 
Haitian 
Blacks 
Dominican 
Republic 0 0 2 0 
Amhara Ethiopia 3 0 1 0 
Malinke Guinea 3 1 0 0 
Mohajirs Pakistan 3 0 0 0 
Roma Slovakia 2 0 2 0 
Indian Tamils Sri Lanka 2 0 2 0 
Ahmadis Pakistan 0 0 3 0.04 
Europeans Zimbabwe 1 0 2 0.04 
Russians Ukraine 3 2 4 0.08 
Uzbeks Afghanistan 3 1 3 0.12 
Poles Belarus 2 1 2 0.12 
East Indians Fiji 0 0 4 0.12 
Russians Azerbaijan 1 0 0 0.15 
Russians Belarus 1 0 0 0.15 
Russians Georgia 1 2 0 0.15 
Russians Lithuania 1 2 0 0.15 
Berbers Morocco 3 1 3 0.15 
Russians Tajikistan 1 2 0 0.15 
Russians Turkmenistan 1 2 0 0.15 
Russians Uzbekistan 1 2 0 0.15 
Biharis Bangladesh 0 1 4 0.27 
Russians Latvia 1 2 3 0.27 
Somalis Kenya 3 1 3 0.3 
Hazaras Afghanistan 2 5 4 0.45 
Rohingya 
(Arakanese) Burma 3 0 4 0.45 
Afars Ethiopia 3 3 4 0.45 
Tigreans Ethiopia 3 0 0 0.45 
South 
Tyrolians Italy 3 1 4 0.45 
Hmong Laos 3 2 4 0.45 
Tuareg Niger 2 1 5 0.45 
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Jurassians Switzerland 3 0 4 0.45 
Serbs Croatia 1 2 5 0.49 
Turkish 
Cypriots Cyprus 3 1 4 0.49 
Russians Estonia 1 2 4 0.49 
Russians Kazakhstan 3 2 5 0.49 
Slavs Moldova 1 0 7 0.49 
Hungarians Yugoslavia 3 5 4 0.49 
Ndebele Zimbabwe 3 1 6 0.49 
Crimean 
Russians Ukraine 3 2 6 0.57 
Armenians Azerbaijan 3 1 5 0.58 
Bodos India 3 1 4 0.58 
Kosovo 
Albanians Yugoslavia 3 5 4 0.61 
Somalis Ethiopia 3 0 5 0.7 
Pashtuns 
(Pushtuns) Pakistan 3 1 5 0.82 
Malay-
Muslims Thailand 3 1 6 0.82 
Sri Lankan 
Tamils Sri Lanka 2 1 7 0.84 
Hutus 
Dem. Rep. of 
the Congo 3 0 0  
 Average  2.123 1.21 3.00 0.32 
 
Standard 
Deviation 1.06 1.29 2.13 0.25 
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